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Volume XI SPRING-SUMMER 1962 Number 1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF THE PAR-
TICIPATION OF CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED PROGRAM OF MAS-
SIVE FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION'
JOHN CORNELIUS HAYES
HERE is no official Catholic position for or against the Adminis-
tration's proposed program of massive Federal aid to education.2
TIndependently of that proposed program, there is no official
Catholic demand for the public financing of parochial schools. There
is no unanimity of Catholic opinion as to the wisdom and prudence
MR. HAYES received his A.B., 1931, Georgetown University; J.D., 1937, Loyola Uni-
versity of Chicago; Litt.D., 1961 (Honorary) Aquinas College; Dean and Professor,
Loyola University Law School. He has lectured throughout the United States for the
past fifteen years on the subject of this article, most recently before the Catholic
Lawyers Guild of New York City. Mr. Hayes is the Chairman of the Chicago Bar
Association's Committee on State Constitutional Revision. He is a member of the
Chicago and Illinois State Bars.
1 The writer welcomes the opportunity to present his views on this controversial
subject. His views are not simply repetitious of those expressed by the Legal Depart-
ment of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in their excellent study published
in 50 GEO. L. J. 401-55 (1961). The reader is also apprised that, since the writer's term of
office as President of the National Council of Catholic Men has expired, he no longer
sustains the position he had when he testified on this matter in March of 1961 before
the Congressional Subcommittees then considering it, namely, the position of represent-
ative of the Joint Councils' Executive Committee of the National Council of Catholic
Men and the National Council of Catholic Women, organizations which together
represent millions of Catholic parents throughout the United States.
2 The only statement which can purport to be an official statement of the Catholic
position is the statement issued on March 2, 1961, by the Most Reverend Karl J. Alter,
Archbishop of Cincinnati, in his capacity as the then Chairman of the Administrative
Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Informally announcing the results
of the deliberations of the Board at its March, 1961, meeting, Archbishop Alter's state-
ment, while not binding upon any individual American Bishop in respect of his own
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of taking advantage of any public aid to parochial education which
may be or become available.
In respect of the Administration's proposed program of massive
Federal aid to education, the official Catholic position is simply this:
Should the American people decide to initiate such a program at any
level of education, then church-related schools at that level, either as
such or through their students and the parents of their students, must
in justice be equitably included.3 And this position is based on the
further position that the participation of church-related schools in any
such program, in any of the several forms in which such participation
has been suggested and specifically in the form of long-term, com-
pensatory-interest-rate loans, is constitutionally permissible under the
Federal Constitution as presently construed.4
Some Catholics also think that the failure to provide for such par-
ticipation would itself be unconstitutional as a violation of Fifth
Amendment due process, in that: (a) such a constitutionally unneces-
sary differentiating classification would be wholly arbitrary; and (b)
such a constitutionally unnecessary omission would subvert the consti-
tutionally protected right of a parent to direct and control the edu-
cation of his child and the constitutionally protected right of every
person to the free exercise of his religion, by making it economically
impractical for great numbers of parents to exercise their rights and
for church-related schools to continue to exist.5
Why does anyone think that the participation of church-related
schools in the Administration's proposed program is unconstitutional?
The non-lawyer is likely to think so because of his uncritical accept-
ance, as a principle of constitutional law, of an absolute separation of
Church and State. But not only is there no such principle expressed
in the Federal Constitution itself, but the United States Supreme Court
in the 1952 case of Zoracb v. Clauson6 repudiated the concept as a
position, represents the collective position of the American Bishops as a group. Para-
graph One of the statement supports the text. The writer has been informed that the
statement stands unchanged by any subsequent action of the Administrative Board or
of the collective American Bishops.
3 Paragraph Two of Archbishop Alter's statement.
4 Paragraph Three of Archbishop Alter's statement.
5 For example, Dr. Frank Brown, Professor of Economics at De Paul University, an
articulate and able member of Citizens for Educational Freedom, has expressed this
point of view to the writer.
0 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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principle of constitutional law. That case litigated the Federal consti-
tutionality of the New York City plan of "released-time" religious
education, as authorized by a New York statute and implemented by
the local Board of Education. The Court held that the New York
City plan, unlike the Champaign (Illinois) plan previously litigated in
the McCollum7 case, did not violate the "establishment of religion"
clause of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as con-
strued and applied to the several states through the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the previous McCollum de-
cision. In the course of its opinion, the Court said:
The First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one
on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and
religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities
would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate
the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in
the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving
Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oath-these and all other
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our
ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or
agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each
session: "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."'8
On the contrary, the Court, after noting that "we are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," further
stated:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it fol-
lows the best of our traditions. For then it respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the gov-
ernment show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be prefer-
ring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.' 0
There is, therefore, no such constitutional principle as an absolute
separation of Church and State.
There is, however, as the Court explained, a constitutional prin-
7 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
8 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
9Jd. at 313.
10 Id. at 313-14.
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ciple of separation of Church and State in certain respects. This prin-
ciple does not require the exclusion of religion from public life or the
profession of agnosticism by public officials, but it does limit the State
in its activities vis-a-vis religion. Under the First Amendment, neither
the Federal government nor, now, any State may pass laws "respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of." The philosophical basis for these constitutional limitations is an
enlightened awareness of the total absence of any competence, any
jurisdiction, on the part of the state in matters relating to the eternal
welfare of its citizens." The competence and jurisdiction of the state
is restricted to the protection and promotion of the common good in
the temporal order within the principle of subsidiarity. Competence
and jurisdiction in matters relating to the eternal order are vested in
the Church. Since the individual man is simultaneously subject to both
jurisdictions, they must be complementary in order to serve his total
interest. Ultra vires acts by either damage their common subject, the
individual member of both societies. His primary civil freedom, there-
fore, is the free exercise of religion, so firmly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, not only generically but as well in terms of specifically
prohibiting the commonest threat to that freedom which he had been
experiencing in the Western Europe of the 17th and 18th centuries:
an establishment of religion by civil law.
Lawyers know that this constitutional ban on laws "respecting an
establishment of religion" has been recently construed for the first
time by the United States Supreme Court and, as construed, applied
to all state and local governments through the medium of the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 If lawyers, therefore,
think that the participation of church-related schools in any program
of massive Federal aid to education is unconstitutional, it will be be-
cause they know that the United States Supreme Court has construed
the constitutional ban on civil laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" to mean "at least this: Neither a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.' 3
The historian knows that this construction of the "no establishment
11 The absolute separatists agree. This proposition is the central theme of Mr. Leo
Pfeffer's CHTURCH, STATE, AND FRE oOM (Beacon Press, Boston, 1953).
12 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
13 Id. at 210.
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of religion" clause is in part historically inaccurate in that, as a matter
of historical fact, the clause, when it became a part of the Federal
Constitution in 1791, did not include the concept that the Federal
Government (the only government to which it then applied) could
not pass laws which "aid all religions" non-preferentially. 14 In his con-
currmg opinion in the McCollum case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter met
this historical fact head-on by admitting it, only to find, however,
that, in the course of the first century of our national development,
the clause had come to include the new meaning. 5
Accepting this construction, in any event, as the currently authori-
tative principle of constitutional law, the real issue now becomes: what
is governmental "aid" within the meaning of this constitutional pro-
hibition? On this point, several decisions of the United States Supreme
Court shed some light:
1. In Bradfield v. Roberts,' a contractual business relationship be-
tween the Federal Government and a hospital corporation owned and
managed by Catholic nuns was attacked as "an establishment of reli-
gion" contrary to the First Amendment. Within the District of Co-
lumbia at that time, there was no isolation hospital facility. By agree-
ment, the nuns contributed a site for such a hospital on their grounds
and undertook to staff and operate it when built. The Federal Govern-
ment agreed in return to construct such a hospital on the site and to
pay the nuns for the isolation care of such indigent patients as the
District might send there. The Court held that the business arrange-
ment was not "an establishment of religion." Rephrasing the holding
in terms of "aid," the Court held that the business relationship did not
constitute "aid" to one religion preferentially within the pristine
meaning of the constitutional prohibition, because the corporation was
a secular institution. The writer submits that an additional reason was
that it did not constitute aid at all. The arms-length exchange of rea-
sonable governmental payments for secular public services received
is obviously not aid. In fact, the government employs ordained min-
isters of religion, not merely for secular governmental work, but even
(non-preferentially) for furnishing religious services to governmental
personnel (e.g., chaplains in the armed services).
14 See, for example, O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
(1949), reviewed by the writer in 35 A.B.A.J. 758 (1949).
15 333 U.S. 203, 212-20 (1948).
16 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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2. In Cochran v. Board of Education,7 the State of Louisiana de-
cided to furnish the free use of secular textbooks to all pupils in the
State who were attending any state-approved school, including paro-
chial schools. The inclusion, in this State tax-supported program, of
pupils in the parochial schools was attacked as a use of public money
for a private, religious, sectarian purpose, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court held (as had the Louisiana Supreme
Court for state purposes) that it was not. Re-phrasing the holding in
terms of aid, the Court held that the furnishing at public expense of
the free use of secular textbooks to all pupils at any approved school
in the State served a public purpose and did not constitute aid to the
private religious institution. The reason was that the public aid here
involved was being furnished, not to the parochial schools which some
of the children in the State attended, but to the children themselves
and to their parents, and the aid related solely to secular, and not re-
ligious, instruction; such aid, therefore, served a legitimate public
purpose of the State.
3. The impact of a similar type of public-purpose educational aid
on the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment was
decided fifteen years later in the Everson case. In that case, New
Jersey decided to furnish school bus transportation at public expense
to all pupils in the State attending any state-approved elementary or
secondary school, including parochial schools; and the highest court
of New Jersey held that such a tax-supported program as applied to
students in parochial schools did not violate the New Jersey State
Constitution as a tax expenditure for a private purpose.' 8 On review
by the United States Supreme Court, the inclusion in the program
of pupils attending parochial schools was then attacked as "an estab-
lishment of religion" (an issue properly made and preserved below).
The United States Supreme Court held that it was not.'" Re-phrasing
the holding in terms of "aid," the Court held that the furnishing of
school bus transportation at public expense to all pupils attending any
state-approved elementary or secondary school in the State was not
"aid" to one religion preferentially or to all religions non-preferen-
tially within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. The reason
was that the public aid here involved was being furnished, not to the
17 281 U.S. 370 (1932).
18 Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (1945).
19 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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parochial schools which some of the children in the State attended,
but to the children themselves and to their parents, to assist them in
their performance of their State-imposed duty under the State com-
pulsory school attendance law, the purpose of which was to insure
the degree of formal secular education necessary for the preservation
of democratic government in New Jersey.
In dictum, moreover, the Court remarked that the governmental
provision at public expense of police and fire protection and of water
and sewage-disposal facilities to a parochial school was not "aid"
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. This observation
takes on added significance when one realizes that the parochial school
is not a municipal taxpayer, and so does not itself contribute to the
public funds used to provide these essential municipal services. The
furnishing of such services to a parochial school is simply a recognition
of its status as an institutional member of the local community. The
services are not related to the religious character of the school, and
are not extended to it in its capacity as a religious institution. Essential
governmental services are extended to all members of the community
for the common good, no matter what their religious nature or affilia-
tion may be.
4. In the Zorach case,2° as already indicated, the Court held that
state-authorized cooperation with all religions non-preferentially by
excusing a child (whose parent so requested) from compulsory at-
tendance at the last hour of public school classes on one day a week,
to enable him to go elsewhere for sectarian religious instruction, was
not state "aid" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
Thus, the New York City program of "released-time" religious in-
struction did not constitute "aid," though the Champaign (Illinois)
program, previously litigated in the McCollum case,21 had. The Cham-
paign program differed from the New York City program in two
important respects: (a) In Champaign, the religious instruction took
place, not only during the regular public school class hours, but in
the public school classrooms themselves, whereas in New York City
it took place, though during regular public school class hours, on
other premises; (b) In Champaign, the public school personnel took
an active part in the operation of the program (distributing and col-
lecting parental consent forms and checking attendance) and the
20 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
21 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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public school superintendent of education had a veto power over the
selection of the religious instructing personnel. It could be said, there-
fore, that state officials had actually participated in the program and
had thereby affirmatively used the power of the state to promote reli-
gious instruction, whereas, in New York City, there was no such
active participation. The thrust of the Zorach decision, however, and
the point here being made, is that the mere accommodation of the
state's compulsory school attendance process and of the public school
class schedule to the request of parent and child for sectarian religious
instruction off the public school premises was not "aid" within the
meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
These few cases demonstrate that, though the constitutional prohi-
bition against laws respecting "an establishment of religion" means
that neither a state nor the Federal Government may aid one religion
preferentially or all religions non-preferentially, the concept of what
constitutes such prohibited "aid" is obviously a sophisticated and not
a simple literal concept. An arms-length business arrangement between
the Federal Government and an order of Catholic nuns for the con-
struction of an isolation hospital and for payment for isolation care
for indigent patients for whose welfare the Federal Government was
responsible, did not constitute such "aid." The State gift of the use of
secular textbooks to all pupils in all elementary and secondary schools
in Louisiana, including parochial schools, did not constitute such
"aid. ' 22 The state's provision of free bus transportation to all pupils
in all elementary and secondary schools in New Jersey, including
parochial schools, did not constitute such "aid." A municipality's pro-
vision of police and fire protection and of water and sewage-disposal
facilities to parochial schools would not constitute such "aid." The
state's accommodation of its compulsory school attendance process and
of its public school class schedule to the request of parent and child
for sectarian religious instruction off the premises during regular pub-
lic school hours did not constitute such "aid." Even the state's en-
forcement of its "Sunday" laws, though incidentally benefiting some
religions and their adherents and detrimentally affecting other reli-
gions and their adherents, did not constitute preferential "aid" within
the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.2
In fact, in view of these cases, the real question would seem to be:
22 By hindsight, in the light of the subsequent Everson decision.
23 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
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what does constitute such "aid"? At the very least, it is obvious that
not all aid is "aid." How, then, does one distinguish the aid which is
constitutional from the aid which is not?
Government lawyers for the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and for the Department of Justice addressed themselves to
this very question in preparing the Administration's legal memoranda
in support of its proposed program of massive Federal aid to educa-
tion. Theirs was the task of supporting the Administration's position
that Federal aid to all colleges without distinction (whether public,
private, or church-related), in the Administration's proposed college-
aid Bill24 providing loans and matching grants for the construction
of academic facilities, was not "aid" within the meaning of the consti-
tutional prohibition; that Federal aid under the National Defense
Education Act of 195825 to all elementary and secondary schools (in
the form of grants to public schools and loans to parochial schools),
for the purchase of equipment with which to teach mathematics, sci-
ence, and foreign languages, was not "aid" within the meaning of the
constitutional prohibition; tacitly, that a later proposed amendment to
the extended National Defense Education Act26 providing inter alia
Federal aid to private and parochial elementary and secondary schools
(in the form of long-term, compensatory-interest-rate loans for the
construction of academic facilities in which to teach mathematics, sci-
ence, and foreign languages) was not "aid" within the meaning of the
constitutional prohibition; that the long-term, compensatory-interest-
rate loans made available to all colleges without distinction (whether
public, private, or church-related) by the College Housing Act of
1950 (as amended in 1961)27 for the construction of student dormi-
tories and centers, was not "aid" within the meaning of the constitu-
tional prohibition; BUT that the inclusion of parochial schools (even
to the mere extent of providing long-term, compensatory-interest-rate
loans solely for the construction of academic facilities) in the Admin-
istration's bill2 8 for massive Federal aid to public elementary and sec-
24 S. 1241, H.R. 5266 and H.R. 7215, 87th Congress, First Session (1961); and S. 1241
and H.R. 8900, 87th Congress, Second Session (1962), except that the 1962 Senate Bill
eliminates the matching grants.
25 20 U.S.C. § 445 (1958).
20 S. 2345 and H.R. 7904, 87th Congress, First Session (1961).
27 12 U.S.C. § 1749-49c (1958), as amended in 1961 by § 12 U.S.C.A. 1749g (1961).
28 S. 1021 and H.R. 4970, 87th Congress, First Session (1961).
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ondary schools only (in the form of grants for the construction of
academic facilities or for the payment of teachers' salaries or, under
the 'Prouty amendment, for any operating expense whatever) would
constitute "aid" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
One need not agree with their conclusions, in support of these ap-
parendy contradictory Administration positions, to be impressed with
the sincerity of their professional efforts and to pay careful attention
to the bases for their conclusions. In their memorandum of March 28,
1961, they advised as follows:
(a) All grants to parochial elementary and secondary schools would
constitute "aid" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
(b) The long-term, compensatory-interest-rate construction loans
then being sought for parochial elementary and secondary schools (by
way of permitting such schools to participate in the Administration's
bill for aid to public elementary and secondary schools only) would
also constitute "aid" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tion, fundamentally because loans are in reality simply grants of credit.
(c) Nevertheless, in determining when aid is "aid," no single crite-
rion is ever controlling; rather, one must balance out a whole complex
of diverse factors, the enumeration of which may be inferred from the
writer's summary of their advice as to the constitutionality of the
equipment loans in the NDEA: since those equipment loans have a
(1) limited and (2) non-religious purpose (3) which is vital to the
national defense and (4) which is not otherwise timely achievable, the
(5) minimal degree of aid (6) incidentally involved for the parochial
schools would not constitute "aid" within the meaning of the consti-
tutional prohibition.
On the same bases, in a supplementary memorandum of late June,
1961, they advised that the later-proposed "special purpose" construc-
tion loans to parochial elementary and secondary schools for academic
facilities in which to teach mathematics, science, and foreign lan-
guages would not constitute "aid" within the meaning of the consti-
tutional prohibition (though, in their opinion, grants for the same
"special purpose" would).
It is submitted that the government lawyers recognize, therefore, as
they must, that the First Amendment, despite its flat wording, was not
intended to, and did not, establish absolute freedoms, and that, as pres-
ently construed in terms of "no governmental aid to one religion pref-
erentially or to all religions non-preferentially," not all aid is "aid."
FEDERAL AID TO CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS
Rather, one must balance the type and degree of aid incidentally in-
volved against the urgency of the national need and the practical
necessity of the aid as a timely and effective means of fulfilling that
need. The scales may be heavily weighted in favor of the First
Amendment freedoms, but they are not absolutes, and the final deci-
sion must be made in the light of the over-all national common good.
This approach explains how the government lawyers reached con-
tradictory conclusions about the constitutional validity of the same
type and degree of incidental aid (namely, long-term, compensatory-
interest-rate loans for the construction of academic facilities) in the
two Administration proposals for massive Federal aid to education:
(a) in the college bill, such loans are made available to all colleges
without distinction (whether public, private, or church-related), and
the government lawyers support the constitutionality of this provision;
(b) in the elementary and secondary school bill, such loans were sug-
gested as an amendment to the Administration bill and later proposed
as a separate Senate bill sponsored by Senators Clark and Morse,29 and
in both instances the government lawyers took the position that the
proposal was unconstitutional. Since the type and degree of incidental
aid are identical and since the urgency of the national need is identical,
the only variable left is the practical necessity of the aid as a timely
and effective means of fulfilling the urgent national need, and thus of
subserving the national common good.
A careful reading of the March 28th memorandum furnished by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (with the assistance
of the Department of Justice) will disclose that that was precisely the
distinction taken by the government lawyers. Their distinction was
probably based on the following facts: (a) At the college level, over
one-half of the nation's colleges, enrolling more than 40% of the na-
tion's college students, are private or church-related. It is obvious,
therefore, that no college-aid program which excludes private and
church-related colleges can hope to be effective, much less timely.
Hence, they must be included, and their inclusion through loans is
constitutional. (b) At the elementary and secondary school level, on
the other hand, less than 15% of the nation's students are enrolled in
private and parochial schools-a relatively insignificant percentage,
which the public schools, moreover, are both willing and able to ab-
sorb, even though the number of such students exceeds 5,000,000.
29 S. 1482, 87th Congress, First Session (1961).
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Hence, there is no practical necessity for the inclusion of the private
and parochial schools in the Administration's program, and their inclu-
sion in any form would, therefore, be unconstitutional.
Note that there is no denial, nor could there be, that private and
parochial elementary and secondary schools serve a legitimate public
purpose. That they do so is crystal-clear from the fact that attendance
at them constitutes a complete fulfillment of the public duty of com-
pulsory school attendance imposed by the states for the accomplish-
ment of the public purpose of guaranteeing the level of formal educa-
tion essential to the preservation and development of a democratic soci-
ety. That they do so is equally clear from the fact that the overwhelm-
ing percentage of the instruction offered in such schools is in the very
same secular subjects which are being offered in the public schools and
which constitute the legitimate focal point of the state's own interest
in elementary and secondary education. And that they must be per-
mitted to do so as a matter of constitutional law, as long as parents
choose to send their children to them, is the clear holding of the
Meyer and Pierce cases ° of the mid-1920s. The government lawyers,
then, the writer repeats, do not make the mistake of attempting to
deny the public-service function of private and parochial elementary
and secondary schools. What they deny is the practical necessity of
including such schools in the Administration's elementary and second-
ary Federal aid program in order to make that program effective and
timely; and without that practical necessity, they maintain that such
inclusion in any form would be unconstitutional.
It is no answer to the government lawyers' position, therefore, mere-
ly to continue to emphasize the public-service function of private and
parochial elementary and secondary schools. They concede it. The
issue is the practical necessity of including such schools in the Federal
aid program at that level. The relevant answer must deny the govern-
ment's position on that issue, and this the writer does. He submits:
(a) The nation cannot afford to ignore more than 5,000,000 ele-
mentary and secondary school students and still hope for the effective
and timely achievement of the urgent national goal of adequate self-
defense through elementary and secondary education.
(b) There are very many areas throughout the nation in which the
local taxpayers are neither able nor willing to absorb the private and
30 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
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parochial students into the public school system. In the Chicago area,
for example, there are over 330,000 such students in the Catholic paro-
chial schools alone. Archdiocesan officials estimate that their absorp-
tion into the public school system would require an immediate capital
outlay of at least $200,000,000, and an annual operating cost of over
$100,000,000. To maintain that the local taxpayers in the Chicago area
would be either willing or able to shoulder this additional expense
(even with the aid proposed in the Administration's bill) is to be
absurd.
(c) In any event the end result of absorption (viz., a state monopoly
of elementary and secondary education) would sacrifice traditional
American educational values and disserve the national interest.
(d) There is, therefore, no practical, timely, and effective alterna-
tive available.
All this has been said on the basis of the government lawyers' as-
sumption that long-term, compensatory-interest-rate loans constitute
a form of Federal aid. The writer has always denied, and still does,
that this assumption is correct. It is his basic position that such loans
constitute no aid at all,31 and that they are the same type of arms length
business transactions as were involved in the Bradfield case and there
held constitutional. There is no donative element whatever in such
loans. Every dime of the principal amount must be repaid. The
interest rate, recomputed annually, is the average rate which the lender
(the Federal Government) itself is paying in the current year on all
its outstanding borrowings, plus an additional one-quarter of one per
cent to cover the administrative costs involved. In the year 1961, for
example, that interest rate would have worked out at 3- %. The
interest rate is, therefore, fully compensatory. To describe loans such
as these as aid is to take the position that a bank or a savings and loan
company is an eleemosynary corporation, or that a businessman who
sells a customer on credit an article which the customer wants is doing
the customer a favor. The government lawyers who equated such
loans to grants of credit display a basic misconception; such loans are
not grants of credit, but sales of credit. No businessman would pretend
that to extend credit to a customer at compensatory interest rates is to
make him a gift or to do him a favor; businessman and customer,
31 For a state case reaching this conclusion as to public loans to parochial schools
on the same terms and conditions as for all other eligible borrowers, see Schade v.
Allegheny County Institution Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956).
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lender and borrower all know that the transaction is a straight business
deal for their mutual benefit.
In supporting their view that such loans do constitute aid, the most
telling point made by the government lawyers was this: Whenever a
public agency provides such loans to church-related schools under
terms and conditions under which such loans are not commercially
available from private lending agencies, then the loan by the public
agency constitutes aid (which, however, may or may not be "aid"
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition). By aid, they
said, they meant economic benefit. In those terms, the writer thinks
that aid properly means donative economic benefit. In every sale, each
party believes that the transaction will be to his economic benefit,
else the sale would not occur. Has each aided the other? Even if it
were so, such aid is not "aid" under the Bradfield precedent. But the
essential point remains: if government makes loans of a type not com-
mercially available, is not that a donative economic benefit? Not if, in
making the loan, government incurs no actual cost and achieves a pub-
lic benefit which, in its judgment, is worth buying. Government values
differ and government costs differ from those of the private commer-
cial lender. The latter does not make the loan because, in his judgment,
the economic benefit is not worth the economic cost. Government's
judgment under government's circumstances may be that it is. But
surely, it may be said, at least when government makes a loan at a
lower interest rate than that being charged for similar loans by com-
mercial lenders, the lower interest rate aids the borrower. Not neces-
sarily. What is a compensatory interest rate for government differs
from what is a compensatory interest rate for the private lender, be-
cause government need not show a profit on its loans. The differential
would simply be the private profit margin. If the public interest justi-
fies the governmental intrusion into areas normally served by private
business, that public interest plus the government's own compensatory
interest rate is what makes the sale of the use of the money a worth-
while bargain achieved without actual cost to the government.
In summary, then, it is the writer's position that long-term, com-
pensatory-interest-rate construction loans to church-related schools
are not aid at all; that even the government lawyers who think they
are have concluded, on the basis of their own analysis of existing judi-
cial precedent, that they are not "aid" within the meaning of the con-
stitutional prohibition at the college level, and would not be even at
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the elementary and secondary school level for the limited purposes of
the National Defense Education Act; and that the same lawyers on
the same bases have reached a contradictory conclusion as to the pro-
posed inclusion of such loans in the Administration's general ele-
mentary and secondary school bill only because they have miscalcu-
lated the practical necessity of such loans for the timely and effective
achievement of the urgent national requirements for self-defense
through elementary and secondary education.
One loose end remains. The writer has remarked that the govern-
ment lawyers do not deny that the secular education afforded as the
overwhelming percentage of instruction in parochial elementary and
secondary schools makes it clear that these schools serve a public pur-
pose. Others, however, do. The writer has encountered this objection
most often from political scientists and lawyers. In most instances, the
objection arose from a misunderstanding of the thrust of the argument
in the Pierce case for the necessity of parochial elementary schools.
The Pierce case, 32 decided in 1925, litigated the Federal constitutional-
ity of an Oregon statute which capped the climax of the nation-wide
drive for state compulsory school attendance laws by compelling the
attendance of normal children at public elementary schools only. To
the argument that the "liberty" protected against state action by the
Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the recognition of the primary
parental right to direct and control the education of children and more
especially their religious education, Oregon responded by suggesting
that the formal religious education of the children could be accom-
plished in part-time supplementary schools of religion. The reply was
that such schools did not provide parents with a reasonable alternative
because the achievement of the parental objective required that in-
struction in the secular subjects be permeated with religion, an objec-
tive which could be accomplished only in parochial schools which
offered a full curriculum, both secular and religious. This "permea-
tion" argument has led some persons to the conclusion that the whole
curriculum of the parochial elementary school is primarily religious in
nature and therefore private as opposed to public, 33 and that there is,
therefore, a "Catholic" geometry, a "Catholic" English grammar, and
B2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
.3A conclusion which is contradicted by the simple reality that all parochial ele-
mentary schools are in fact subject to public control by state regulations designed to
insure the fulfillment of the state's interest in the education of its future constituents.
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"Catholic" spelling. Were such the case, then, of course parochial ele-
mentary education would be serving primarily a religious and private
purpose rather than a public purpose, and would be for that reason
alone ineligible for any tax-supported aid, since tax money must be
spent for public purposes only.
But there is, of course, no such thing as, for example, "Catholic"
spelling in a parochial school. There is simply spelling, the same spell-
ing as that taught in the public school. And the same thing is true of
all the other secular subjects in the parochial school curriculum. The
difference between spelling or any other secular subject in the paro-
chial school curriculum and the same subject in the public school cur-
riculum lies, not in the secular subject itself or in the method of its in-
struction, but in a distinctive plus contributed to it in the parochial
school, namely, in its orientation to and correlation with the ultimate
eternal destiny of the student. It is in this sense only that all the secular
subjects in the parochial school curriculum are "permeated" with reli-
gion-by being related to the total truth about man. The secular sub-
ject still fulfills the same public purpose as when it is taught in the
public school; but it also fulfills the further purpose of assisting man to
reach Infinite Truth and Infinite Good. The parochial school curricu-
lum, therefore, is not a matter of alternatives: the subserving of either
a public purpose or of a private, religious purpose. Rather, it subserves
both purposes simultaneously, thanks to the distinctive plus of relating
its secular subjects to total truth. The conclusion is that the parochial
school, in instructing its students in the same secular subjects as does
the public school, serves a public purpose in no lesser degree than does
the public school.
And now, what about grants? On the same analysis of constitutional
precedent as that on which the government lawyers have concluded
that the somewhat restricted 4 long-term, compensatory-interest-rate
construction loans to all colleges without distinction (whether public,
private, or church-related), and the more restricted NDEA equip-
inent loans and proposed construction loans to private and parochial
elementary and secondary schools, are not "aid" within the meaning
of the constitutional prohibition, might not grants for the same pur-
poses and with the same restrictions be equally constitutional? It is
34 The reference is to the fact that such loans may not be used for the construction
of any facility for religious worship or for religious instruction or primarily for any
part of the educational program of a school or department of divinity. See, for example,
Sec. 122 (a) (2) B and C of H.R. 8900, 87th Congress, Second Session (1962).
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submitted that the answer is yes. True, there is now no question of the
aid factor; grants, unlike loans, are clearly donative in nature. And the
aid is not minimal in degree. Yet such grants would clearly serve a
public purpose, and the limitations make clear both that the public
purpose is nonreligious and that any aid involved for all religions non-
preferentially is merely a necessary incident to the primarily-sought
public purpose. Once again, then, the decisive issues will be: how vital
and urgent is the national interest to be served by these grants, and
how practically necessary is it to make such grants to church-related
schools in order timely and effectively to achieve that urgent national
interest.
If this conclusion strikes the reader as extreme, let him reflect that
the Federal Government has long made grants to construct, not mere-
ly classrooms for primary use as places of secular education, but places
for Divine Worship Itself, according to the various sectarian rites:
churches and chapels for the accommodation of our men and women
in the armed services and-with apologies to my fellow-servicemen in
World War II for the unhappy association-in the Federal peniten-
tiaries. Hence, there not only may be, but there has long been, such an
urgent national need and such a practical necessity as has warranted
grants to all religions non-preferentially of the use of tax-constructed
facilities for Divine Worship Itself.
The writer has always been impressed with an explanation offered
by Professor Wilber G. Katz for the constitutionality of such grants.35
Professor Katz says that such tax-supported religious services do not
constitute a prohibited establishment of religion whenever not to pro-
vide them would necessarily violate an individual's primarily guaran-
teed right to the free exercise of his religion. Professor Katz under-
stands how incongruous it would be to use, as the instrument for vio-
lating an individual's right to the free exercise of his religion, the
precise specific prohibition which had been initially included in the
First Amendment for the very purpose of further insuring it.
Are there still other forms of constitutionally permissible participa-
tion by church-related schools in any program of massive Federal aid
to education? There are. So far we have been discussing what may be
called institutional forms of participation: loans and grants to the
church-related schools themselves. There are also what may be called
3 5 Wilber G. Katz, "The Freedom to Believe," 192 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 66-69
(October, 1953).
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individual forms of participation: those under which the church-
related schools participate through the participation of their individual
patrons, the students and the parents of the students. The commonest
suggested forms of individual participation are: (a) scholarship grants
and loans to the students, which the students may then use at any
school of their choice, including church-related schools; and (b) fed-
eral tax deductions and tax credits to the parents of students in any
school, including church-related schools.
Such scholarship loans are already available to college students un-
der the existing provisions of the National Defense Education Act.
Such scholarship grants have already been made available to students
who were veterans of World War II and of the Korean police action.
Representative Roman Pucinski of Illinois has requested that the In-
ternal Revenue Service amend its Regulations to permit tuition pay-
ments to any school, including church-related schools, to qualify as
charitable deductions from taxable gross income; it is unlikely, of
course, that this suggestion can be entertained, because tuition pay-
ments are not donative in nature. Representative Church of Illinois has
already introduced legislation 3 to provide federal tax deductions and
tax credits to parents of students attending any school, including
church-related schools. Parents of students attending any college
would be permitted to deduct from taxable gross income any amount
up to $2,000 per student which they could prove had been spent dur-
ing the taxable year for costs directly related to the college education
of the student. Parents of students attending any elementary or second-
ary school would be permitted to deduct from their federal income
tax any amount up to $100 per year which they could prove they had
paid in local property taxes during the taxable year for the support of
the local public schools in their school district. Neither suggestion was
pushed during 1961 and the bills died in Committee.
All these individual forms of participation seem so clearly within
the judicial precedent of the Cochran-Everson cases that the writer
sees no need to develop the point. A caveat, however, is in order: Care
must be taken to establish the public purpose of these individual forms
of participation, as well as the practical necessity of resorting to them
in order timely and effectively to achieve that public purpose.
A word should be said here about a currently pending bill for Fed-
eral aid to elementary and secondary schools which has the attraction
36 H.R. 4978 (and H.R. 340), 87th Congress, First Session (1961).
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of permitting members of the legislative and executive branches of the
Federal Government to by-pass the awkward issue of the constitution-
ality of the participation of church-related schools in a program of
Federal aid to education. The so-called Bailey proposal is to allot to
each State a flat 2 % of an annual grant for elementary and secondary
school construction and operating costs, to be used by the State within
the purposes of the bill in whatever way the State may use its own
funds for the same purposes. Thus, the matter of the permissible par-
ticipation of parochial schools in the Federal funds allocated to each
State would be decided by the law of each State in that regard. This
proposal, however attractive to Federal officials as a "buck-passing"
device, has the transparent flaw of abdicating the national interest to
the conflicting interests of the several states (as the proponents of
racial desegregation in the public schools immediately pointed out). A
Congress dedicated to the national interest has known how to deal
with reluctant states in the Federal "Hot Lunch" program 37 and, most
recently, in the proposed Federal program for public fall-out shel-
ters.3 There is no excuse for Congressional display of any lesser con-
cern for the vital national interest in education.
It is, then, the writer's position that there are a number of constitu-
tionally permissible forms of participation by church-related schools
in any program of massive Federal aid to education. The question re-
mains as to whether any of them ought to be utilized. As the writer
indicated in his opening paragraphs, some Catholics think that they
must be, on pain else of rendering any such program itself unconstitu-
tional. While appreciative of the thrust of this position, the writer
prefers for the present the less contentious position that one or more
or all of those constitutionally permissible forms of participation ought
to be utilized in the interests of the national welfare and of a policy of
constitutional consistency.
The necessity of including church-related schools in any Federal aid
program, in the several forms in which it is constitutionally permissible
to do so, in order effectively and timely to achieve the vital national
interests sought by such a program, has already been sketched. The
constitutional policy to which the writer refers, consistency with
which requires their inclusion, is the policy set by the Meyer and
87 42 U.S.C.A. § 1759 (1961).
38 H.R. 10262, 87th Congress, Second Session (1962).
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Pierce cases (and by Bartels v. Iowaa9 and Farrington v. Tokushige40 ).
The Meyer-Pierce cases identified the basic rights involved in the con-
tinued existence of private and parochial elementary and scondary
schools as being those of the child to an education and those of the
parents to direct and control that child's education. 41 The point being
made is this: the same Federal Government which has vindicated these
basic constitutional rights of parents and children to choose to be
educated in private and church-related schools ought not thereafter to
initiate a program which, by excluding such schools without constitu-
tional necessity, substantially imperils their healthy existence and de-
velopment. On the contrary, to be consistent with the policy of the
constitutional law, comparable aid ought to be afforded to those schools
by including them in the Federal program in forms which are permis-
sible under the Constitution as presently construed.
Why would the initiation of a program of massive Federal aid to
public schools only imperil the healthy existence and development of
the church-related schools thereby excluded without constitutional
necessity? Because, so long as parents and children choose to exercise
their constitutional rights to attend church-related schools, those
schools, in justice both to their patrons and to the governments whose
public purposes they subserve, must keep pace with the educational
facilities, practices, and standards of the public schools. They must do
so, not only to comply with the minimal requirements of govern-
mental supervisory agencies and private accrediting agencies, but also
to continue to a competitively excellent secular education together
with the religious and moral education which is the distinctive plus
value, to provide which those schools exist-the value which the public
schools are legally unable to provide. If and when, therefore, new mas-
sive Federal aid is extended to public schools, church-related schools
will have to keep up with whatever improvements and developments
the Federal money will enable the public schools to undertake and
public and private accrediting agencies thereafter to exact-and this in
addition to meeting the sharp growth demands to which they, like the
public schools, are currently being subjected. The money to sustain
39262 U.S. 404 (1923).
40 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
41 That these were the basic rights involved, underlying the property rights immedi-
ately at issue, see the writer's analysis of these cases in "Law and the Parochial School,"
3 THE CATHOLIC LAWYER 99, 102-4 (1957).
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these new burdens of meeting growth requirements and improved
public school standards must come, either as tuition payments or as
contributions, from the patrons of the church-related schools, who are
also simultaneously sustaining as taxpayers their fair share of the costs
of the growth requirements of the public schools plus the costs of the
new massive Federal aid to the public schools. As an example, if the
State of Mississippi used half of its share of the proposed Federal aid
to public elementary and secondary schools to increase teachers sal-
aries, the estimate is that the annual salary of each such teacher would
be raised $480. In addition to paying their share of the cost of this
Federal aid, the patrons of the church-related schools in Mississippi
would have to match that salary raise for the increasing number of lay
teachers in those schools or be content with second-rate lay teaching
personnel and suffer the inevitable consequences.
This is the prospect which has caused His Eminence, Cardinal Spell-
man to say that any new program of massive Federal aid which ex-
cludes church-related schools is the beginning of the end for those
schools. And the writer's point is that the destruction or substantial
impairment of church-related schools without constitutional necessity
is inconsistent with the policy of constitutional protection of the rights
of children to an education in church-related schools and the rights of
their parents to direct and control the education of their children by
choosing to send them to church-related schools.
In a concurring opinion in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of the State of New York,42 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dis-
cussing the constitutional problem involved in the prior licensing of
the public exhibition of motion pictures, said:
The real problem is the formulation of constitutionally allowable safeguards
which society may take against evil without impinging on the necessary depend-
ence of a free society on the fullest scope of free expression. 43
That same problem exists here. To paraphrase it, the real problem is
the formulation of constitutionally permissible forms of participation
by church-related schools in any new program of massive Federal aid
to education without impinging on the necessary mutual independence
of Church and State in a free society. Judicial precedent indicates that
there are such forms of participation, and the "balancing" formula of
the government's own lawyers indicates their agreement that not all
42 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
43 Id. at 694.
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aid is "aid" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. Un-
der that formula, long-term, compensatory-interest-rate loans to
church-related schools, grants restricted to secular education in
church-related schools, loans and scholarships to students in church-
related schools, tax deductions and tax credits to parents of
students in church-related schools-all are constitutionally permissible
forms of participation by which the urgent national interest may be
effectively and timely achieved in a manner consistent with the estab-
lished policy of constitutional protection of the rights of children and
parents to an education in the church-related schools of their choice.
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